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THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL
Kevin M. Clermont*
[British] Judge: Mr Houlihan, is your client aware of the
maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis?
[Irish] Counsel: My Lord, in the bogs of Connemara they
speak of little else.'
INTRODUCTION
In the legal bogs of the United States, judges and lawyers really
are speaking of little besides Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 2 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 the two recent cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court revolutionized the law on pleading.' Academics too seem
* Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. I want to thank Jodi Balsam,
Joe Cecil, Scott Dodson, Mike Dorf, Robin Effron, Simona Grossi, Edward
Hartnett, Lonny Hoffman, Allan Ides, Mitch Lowenthal, Liz Schneider, Adam
Steinman, Steve Subrin, Suja Thomas, Beth Thornburg, Steve Yeazell, and
Julie Cromer Young for illuminating conversations and communications on the
old and new subjects of pleading. Also, I appreciate the fruitful opportunity to
have presented this paper at the June 2010 Association of American Law
Schools Workshop on Civil Procedure in New York City.
1. Peter Heerey, Aesthetics, Culture, and the Whole Damn Thing, 15 LAW
& LITERATURE 295, 306 (2003). The story must be apocryphal, as it appears in
many different places in an almost equal number of variations. The Latin in
this particularly appropriate variation means: "In equal fault, the stronger is
the situation of the defendant."
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (dismissing an antitrust complaint that alleged an
agreement in conclusory terms based upon information and belief, with the lack
of detail owing to the fact that the plaintiffs had no proof in hand without
discovery).
3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (dismissing a civil rights complaint, while
clarifying the intricate workings and broad applicability of Twombly).
4. By discombobulating a fundamental area of law, Twombly has managed
to induce an absolutely extraordinary 29,704 cases to cite it in its first thirty-
seven months as law, as measured by a Westlaw KeyCite search on July 2,
2010. It is on track to become the most-cited Supreme Court case of all time,
unless it is surpassed by Iqbal itself, which has received 10,263 judicial
citations in thirteen months. See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of
Celotex- Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the
Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 86-88, 143-45 (2006) (discussing the
measurement of a case's precedential importance by the number of cases citing
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obsessed."
Together with Professor Stephen Yeazell, I have already written
about the three destabilizing attributes of Twombly and Iqbal: their
doctrine is thoroughly novel, quite uncertain, and shakily resting on
a foundation laid by a faulty legal process.6 We fervently criticized
the cases on those grounds, even though we were, and remain,
agnostic on the question of whether notice pleading needs to be
tightened. But the time for shock-and-awe commentary has passed.
The time has come to think about moving forward. How will the
new regime work?
One cannot figure out precisely what the two founding cases
mean without ascertaining what they do not mean. Although I shall
begin by provisionally summarizing the regime that the cases
seemed to establish, I shall quickly shift to the necessary task of
brush-clearing. I shall do that by refuting the three major myths
that have arisen from misreadings of the two cases now seemingly
prevalent in case and commentary.
By way of prologue, then, it was a deeply worrying supposition
about meritless claims inundating the courts and inflicting
discovery burdens that pushed the Justices into action. Twombly
and Iqbal added a pleading requirement for claimants that goes
beyond having to give notice. Invoking Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2)'s "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,"7 the Court imposed on the
plaintiff the burden of establishing, by nonconclusory allegations,
the complaint's plausibility as to liability on the merits." Thus the
Court, by case decision rather than by rulemaking, blazed a new and
unclear path for all civil cases heard in federal court.9 Much
to it and compiling tables of the previously most-cited cases, with the summary
judgment case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), listed as
the case most often cited both by federal courts and by all courts combined).
But cf James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court
Precedent, 30 Soc. NETWORKS 16, 22 (2008) (using network analysis to name
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), as the most important Supreme
Court precedent, without a procedure case in sight).
5. For example, the January 2010 convention of the Association of
American Law Schools in New Orleans was "like a notice pleading wake!" E-
mail from Julie Cromer Young, Assoc. Professor, Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law,
to author (Jan. 20, 2010, 10:00 EST) (on file with author). Or as a writer for
Slate put it: "[To America's civil-procedure professors, the effect . .. was akin to
releasing a live ferret amid the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Dahlia
Lithwick, The Attorney General Is a Very Busy Man, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2008),
http://www.slate.com/id/2206441.
6. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-
57 (2007).
9. The Pretrial Practice and Discovery Committee of the ABA's Section of
Litigation maintains a chart of the most significant decisions within each circuit
[Vol. 451338
HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1338 2010
2010] THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL
remains cloudy, but it now appears that pleading should work in the
following way. 10
First, upon a challenge to legal sufficiency, the judge should
proceed in the traditional way for a demurrer by asking whether any
legal claim exists that would be consistent with the words of the
complaint-that is, the complaint must encompass a legal claim
without including allegations that would defeat it." Henceforth,
however, the plaintiff must do more to identify the complaint's legal
theories, as a practical matter, because the plaintiff must be specific
enough for the judge to weigh the complaint's factual sufficiency
under the next test.
Second, to satisfy the factual-sufficiency test, the plaintiff must
plead facts and perhaps some evidence.12 The plaintiff should give a
particularized mention of the factual circumstances of each element
of the causes of action.' 3 The degree of particularization should be
sufficient to make plausible an inference of liability, with the judge
testing the plausibility not of each fact but only of the moving
defendant's ultimate liability on the particular cause.14 The judge
performs the decisional task (1) by ignoring any conclusory
allegation, such as a bald assertion that an element exists, and (2)
after accepting the remaining allegations as true, by weighing the
plausibility of the liability inference in light of his or her judicial
experience and common sense as applied in the case's particular
context.'1 This new approach will most seriously impact the
plaintiff who needs discovery to learn the required factual
particulars.
This simple summary has not, however, captured the minds of
the citizenry. Instead, three widely prevailing myths lead to
mistaken views that can seriously overstate or understate the cases'
significance. Each of the myths builds on its own faulty premise, as
I shall now try to show.
interpreting the meaning and proper application of Iqbal. ABA Sec. Litig.,
Pretrial Practice & Discovery Comm., Iqbal Task Group: Chart of Cases, Am.
BAR AsS'N, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/pretrial/docs/iqbal
-task-group-chart.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); see also Memorandum from
Andrea Kuperman on Review of Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal to the Civil Rules Comm. & Standing Rules
Comm. of the U.S. Courts (May 25, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal-memo_051710.pdf (presenting a study prepared
for the Rules Advisory Committee and stating that "it remains difficult to draw
many generalized conclusions about how the courts are interpreting and
applying" the pleading requirements).
10. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1163-64 (10th ed. 2010) (setting out a similar summary).
11. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
12. See id.
13. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 256 (2000).
14. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
15. See id.
1339
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I. MYTH #1: THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL COURT HAS REVIVED
FACT PLEADING
A. Looking to the Past
Many observers have concluded that the Supreme Court has, in
Twombly and Iqbal, readopted fact pleading for the federal courts."
Depending on one's vantage point, the Court either is thereby
foolishly leading a march into the past or is finally correcting the
modem mistake of notice pleading. But, regardless of the wisdom
that such a move would reflect, it is in actuality clear that the Court
has not readopted fact pleading.
1. How Fact Pleading Works
The place to begin is reconsideration of the nature of fact
pleading. It arrived as part of the Field Code of 1848.17 The new
pleading regime's defining characteristic was its requirement for
complaints to state "the facts constituting the cause of action, in
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended." 8
More than history is in play here. Fact pleading persists today
in a good number of states," as well as in a number of federal
16. Cf Adam McDonell Moline, Comment, Nineteenth Century Principles
for Twenty-First Century Pleading, 60 EMoRY L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623102 (emphasizing David Dudley Field's original
conception). My aim here is not to play gotcha. Rather than citing people who
got this point wrong, I shall refer to only one of our wisest commentators, who
took a first step in the direction of viewing Twombly as reembracing fact
pleading before correcting course in light of Iqbal. For that example, drawn
from my esteemed colleague's work, compare Michael C. Dorf, The End of Notice
Pleading?, DORF ON L. (May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org
/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (surmising that Twombly imposes a
heightened-fact-pleading standard), with Michael C. Dorf, My Letter to the
Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding Notice Pleading, DORF ON L. (Nov. 24,
2009, 1:36 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/11/my-letter-to-senate-judiciary
-committee.html (distinguishing the older test of fact specificity from the new
regime). See also Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEwIS & CLARK L.
REV. 217 (2010) (broadening his analysis).
17. See FIELD ETAL., supra note 10, at 1119-23, 1148-53.
18. Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521.
19. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367, 1378, 1432 (1986) (listing the seventeen states that, in 1986, required
some form of fact pleading, and noting that those states contained a majority of
the country's population). Nebraska has since left that fact-pleading fold. See
Legis. B. 876, 97th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2002) (adopting notice pleading).
However, the trend in state procedure of moving toward the Federal Rules'
model has definitely slowed. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal
Rules in State Courts, 3 NEv. L.J. 354 (2003) (updating his earlier article by
studying states' adoption of recent federal amendments to civil procedure rules).
1340 [Vol. 45
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provisions.20 The typical requirement adopted by the framers of the
various fact-pleading states' codes is that a pleader should give a
"plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of
action."21 The parties were to lay out the facts appropriately so that
the court could apply the law.22
This mandate sounds simple. But vast accumulations of
interpreting cases belie that simplicity, without yielding clear
guidelines for decisions. What went wrong?
The code framers' most seriously wrong turn was their failure to
realize that every statement of fact is both specified and generalized
to some degree, because any description of a given situation requires
selection and rejection of detail. The statement appropriate for
pleading will depend on the objectives of pleading.23
Fact pleading therefore came to require the claimant to plead
only the "ultimate facts," choosing ones that together constituted a
"cause of action." "The pleader was not to 'plead his evidence,' for
that was being too specific; nor was he to 'plead conclusions of law,'
for that was being too general; he was to plead the 'ultimate [or
operative] facts."'25
Does the lawyer "plead a contract by reciting that 'A said this, B
said that, and so on' or by reciting that 'A and B mutually agreed
such and such'?"" The standard proves quite unclear in application.
The former allegation might be mere evidence, and the latter might
be a legal conclusion.27 What of "A is the wife of B"? The
20. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 1296-1301.1, at 197-202, 297-98 (3d ed. 2004) (evaluating
pleading requirements under FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and securities-fraud statutes).
21. Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, § 142(2), 1851 N.Y. Laws
876, 887 (1851). From its beginning, the Field Code in New York underwent
frequent revision. Today, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3013 (McKinney 1991) provides:
"Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and
parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or
occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of
action or defense." Although the section's omission of the word "facts" was
liberalizing, see DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 208 (4th ed. 2005), its
retention of "cause of action" has left New York with at least one foot in the
fact-pleading camp, see Oakley & Coon, supra note 19, at 1411.
22. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 38
(2d ed. 1947); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 329
(1988).
23. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 231-32; FIELD ET AL., supra note 10,
at 1152-53.
24. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1152; 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1218, at 265 (3d ed.
2004).
25. FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1152; see also 5 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 24, § 1218, at 265-67.
26. FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1152.
27. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 229-30, 234-39 (providing further
examples of the difficulties and challenges of fact pleading); see also id. § 45, at
1341
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impropriety of such an allegation turns on whether the parties are
likely to fight over the marital status.2
Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the uncertainty. More
than a century and a half of interpretation helps. Officially
approved forms for common types of actions, and unofficial practice
books with forms, offer further assistance. 29 Litigators and judges
seem to have acquired a fairly good grasp of the level of factual
detail that the mandate requires.ao
Thus, fact-pleading jurisdictions do manage. Still, partly
because of the remaining uncertainty and the resulting litigation,
their version of fact pleading has tended to fade into a form that is
sometimes difficult to distinguish from notice pleading."' Even the
leading treatise on code pleading phrases the object of fact pleading
as "fair notice of each material fact of the pleader's cause."3 2 For the
federal courts, of course, the rulemakers abandoned fact pleading in
1938, and the courts gradually adopted notice pleading.13  Many
276-77.
28. See id. § 38, at 232 (stating that the propriety turns on the nature of
the case: the factual allegation is proper if A and B are suing for their
individual injuries in a single case; the allegation is an improper legal
conclusion if the marriage is a key fact, as when B is suing for loss of services of
A).
29. See, e.g., 1 DEBORAH L. NELSON & JENNIFER L. HowiCz, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS § 2:7 (3d ed. 1994); 9 ALAN D.
SCHEINKMAN, WEsTs MCKINNEY'S FORMS: MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAW §§ 1:1-
3:103 (2007).
30. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 233-34 (giving examples of case-
specific, proper factual allegations and judicial dispositions of allegations under
the system of code pleading); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1298, at
197-202 (explaining that judicial precedent has provided judges and attorneys
examples of proper interpretation of the pleading requirements of FED. R. CIv.
P. 9(b)); id. § 1301.1, at 297-98 (noting fact-pleading requirements in securities-
fraud statutes).
31. For example, California is a fact-pleading state, but its modern
decisions often espouse notice pleading. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 19, at
1383; cf Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 476-77 (Cal. 2009)
(asserting after Twombly that "we may affirm the sustaining of a demurrer only
if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory").
32. CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 232. One might think that Judge Clark
was expressing a bias in favor of notice pleading, but in fact he was not a fan of
notice pleading. Rather than notice pleading, he favored so-called simple
pleading. See Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 299-303 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008)
(discussing Clark's view and its critics).
33. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1202, at 87-92. It appears
that notice pleading actually arrived with Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),
rather than with the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1665,
1685-86 (1998) (arguing that prior to Conley the original Rules maintained
more of a gatekeeping function for pleading).
[Vol. 451342
HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1342 2010
2010] THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL
states openly followed suit." This change has not generated much
nostalgia until now.
2. How Nonconclusory-and-Plausible Pleading Differs
Now the Supreme Court has rebuilt the federal pleading
regime. When one tries to absorb something this new, particularly
when the new appears very confusing, one naturally looks to
experience for some help. The only plausible procedural analog for
the Twombly-Iqbal requirements is fact pleading.36 Moreover,
34. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 831 & n.40 (estimating the
number of states "that have adopted the Federal Rules as their pleading model"
at "thirty or so").
35. See id. at 825-26 & n.12 (mentioning occasional attempts in the past to
roll back FED. R. Civ. P. 8); infra note 58 and accompanying text (observing the
current resurgence of enthusiasm for fact pleading in its old form).
36. One could take a comparative-law perspective on the debate. See, e.g.,
Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 441, 455 (2010) ("This nearly universal standard is.. . essentially similar
to the old code pleading requirement rejected by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.... Recent trends in American pleading suggest that America may
be moving toward the global norm by experimenting with more rigorous fact
pleading and dispensing with mere notice pleading."); James R. Maxeiner,
Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative Reflections
on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 29-35), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1579196 (comparing American and German pleading requirements).
Although the comparative-law lessons are valuable for scholars, foreign practice
is not sufficiently familiar to most lawyers and judges for the comparison to
serve the practical purpose of providing a guiding hand through the actual
pleading process. Moreover, foreign systems may not be an apt comparison
because their pleading is more permissive where Twombly-Iqbal has the most
bite: in the situation in which the plaintiff has no access to the needed
information in the defendant's hands, the civil law does not require a high level
of specificity from the plaintiff and instead often shifts the burden of proof and
pleading to the defendant. See, e.g., Antonio Carchietti, Responsabilitd Civile
del Medico e Della Struttura Sanitaria e Canoni di Ripartizione dell'Onere
Probatorio tra Vittima e Convenuto [Liability in Torts of the Doctor and the
Hospital and the Criteria for Distributing the Burden of Proof Between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant], DIRITIO E GIUSTIZIA 2010, 0, 18 (It.) (describing
how the shifted burden of proof in medical malpractice cases in Italy greatly
lessens the specificity requirement for the plaintiff in pleading both breach and
causation).
The simple fact is that civil-law pleading schemes do not serve a significant
gatekeeping purpose. Those systems use pleading more as a way to start the
case effectively, rather than as a way to weed out weak cases. Thus, they truly
are more like old American fact pleading than like the Twombly-Iqbal
innovation. Cf ALIUNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE princ. 11.3 (2006) ("In the pleading phase, the parties must present
in reasonable detail the relevant facts, their contentions of law, and the relief
requested, and describe with sufficient specification the available evidence to be
1343
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because nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading requires the plaintiff
to plead particularized facts, the typical federal complaint of the
future will look much like a complaint drafted under a fact-pleading
regime.
Therefore, some commentators have looked to fact pleading for
illumination. But it provides none of the needed comfort or
instruction, because the Twombly-Iqbal Court's approach is
thoroughly new. Commentators who stress that the new and old
pleading standards both required more factual detail than does
notice pleading mask some big differences. The more useful
message would be that the Court did not reimpose fact pleading.
Three observations settle that point.
First, the Court expressly denied that it reimposed fact
pleading. Twombly maintained that "we do not require heightened
fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."37  Indeed, the Court in
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz had earlier refused to append any so-
called heightened-fact-pleading requirement absent a special
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or statutory provision. Twombly
offered in support of their allegations. When a party shows good cause for
inability to provide reasonable details of relevant facts or sufficient specification
of evidence, the court should give due regard to the possibility that necessary
facts and evidence will develop later in the course of the proceeding."); the
ALI/UNIDROIT principle attempts to capture the civil law, but seems partially
to miss.
Indeed, pleadings have long played a comparatively small role in Europe.
See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOwA L. REV. 272, 273 (1942) ("In
the countries of Continental Europe very little is expected of these
documents. .. ."). Maybe one has to go farther than Europe to find a telling
comparison for the new gatekeeping regime. See Andrea Cheuk, Comment, The
Li'an ("Docketing") Process: Barriers to Initiating Lawsuits in China and
Possible Reforms, 26 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 72, 75-79 (2008) (describing China's
system of extreme policing of complaints).
37. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also id. at 569
n.14 ("[We do not apply any 'heightened' pleading standard, nor do we seek to
broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 . . . ."); cf Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era. . . .").
38. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that
heightened fact pleading was not required in a case involving a Title VII
employment discrimination claim); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that a court
could not impose a heightened-fact-pleading standard in a case involving a civil
rights claim against a municipality). Some lower courts had been demanding
heightened fact pleadings. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,
81 TEx. L. REV. 551 (2002); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 Aluz. L. REV. 987 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling
Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
1344 [Vol. 45
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expressly preserved those prior cases as still good law, citing them
repeatedly before outright denying that the new rule "runs counter"
to them. 9 Although some lower-court cases persist in saying that
the Court must nonetheless have overruled those prior cases, 0 those
courts are incorrect.4 ' There is no inconsistency between rejecting
heightened fact pleading and adopting nonconclusory-and-plausible
pleading, because the two are different systems: the former requires
factual detail, while the latter tests for factual convincingness.
I nonetheless do not mean to conflate heightened fact pleading
and classic fact pleading. The heightened fact pleading that the
Supreme Court rejected differed from code-style fact pleading as
well.4 2  The heightened-fact-pleading courts were shifting more
toward gatekeeping. They demanded a lot of factual detail, partly to
discourage plaintiffs from filing claims. 3 Requiring greater factual
detail also gave courts an excuse to weed out frivolous cases before
discovery." Still, they were not acting as Twombly-Iqbal
gatekeepers, in that they did not yet have the Twombly-Iqbal
weapons of paring down the complaint by ignoring many allegations
and of testing the remainder for reasonable convincingness.
Second, the Twombly facts themselves best show the difference
between classic fact pleading and nonconclusory-and-plausible
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
39. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70.
40. See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)
(dictum); Hughes v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Colo.
2009) (dictum); Harley v. Paulson, No. 07-3559 (JBS), 2008 WL 5189931, at *3
(D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2008) (dictum); Kamar v. Krolczyk, No. 1:07-CV-0340 AWl TAG,
2008 WL 2880414, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2008); Aztec Energy Partners, Inc.
v. Sensor Switch, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 226, 228 (D. Conn. 2007).
41. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 33-35), available at http://ssm.com
/abstract=1561369 (arguing that Swierkiewicz survived Twombly-Iqbal); Joseph
A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 193-95 (2010) (same);
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1322-23
(2010) (same).
42. See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton,
Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 262-65 (2010)
(distinguishing the modem federal cases that adopted heightened fact pleading
from earlier cases that required code-style fact pleading, on the ground that
these modern courts did so for the purpose of excluding so-called frivolous cases,
whereas earlier courts used fact pleading to narrow the issues at an earlier
stage in litigation).
43. Indeed, the demand for factual detail under heightened fact pleading
could sometimes exceed the detail demanded by nonconclusory-and-plausible
pleading. See, e.g., Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that Iqbal overturned the remnants of heightened
fact pleading-and its extra demands-in that circuit. See Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010).
44. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 836 n.57 (distinguishing the
frivolity standard from the plausibility standard).
1345
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pleading:
[T]elephone and Internet subscribers brought a class action
against various telecommunications giants, claiming an illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade. Under antitrust law, however,
parallel and even consciously identical conduct unfavorable to
competition is not illegal if it comprises only independent acts
by competitors without any agreement. The complaint alleged
parallel conduct in great detail, explaining how each company
sought to inhibit upstarts in its own region and refrained from
entering the other major companies' regions. But the
complaint alleged an agreement in conclusory terms based
upon information and belief because the plaintiffs had no proof
yet in hand.
Pleading the critical element of agreement merely by stating
conclusions on information and belief, as Mr. Twombly did, would
have been fine under fact pleading. Fact pleading permitted
pleading elements of a cause of action on information and belief, as
when the plaintiff lacked the needed information." Fact pleading
especially allowed conclusory pleading when the plaintiff had no
access to needed information that was in the defendant's hands.4 7
45. Id. at 826 (footnotes omitted). Twombly is the cleaner illustration of
sufficient pleading, but in my opinion the Iqbal complaint likewise would have
passed muster under fact pleading. The twenty-nine-page Twombly complaint
is available at Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Twombly v. Bell
Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (No. 02 CIV 10220),
2003 WL 25629874. The fifty-four-page Iqbal complaint is available at First
Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV
1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3756442.
46. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 36, at 216 ("Affirmative allegations of fact
in the complaint may be made upon information and belief instead of positively,
so that the pleader may be enabled to verify even where he lacks definite
knowledge."); id. § 36, at 220-21 (expanding that idea); cf. 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 20, § 1298, at 192 n.7 (collecting cases applying this lenient
approach under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). Of course, the same is true of notice
pleading. See Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)
("The Twombly plausibility standard, which applies to all civil actions, does not
prevent a plaintiff from 'pleading facts alleged upon information and belief
where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the
defendant. ... " (citation omitted) (quoting Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202,
215 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also Edward A.
Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 503-05
(2010).
47. See PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE
CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 310, at 454 (St. Paul, West 3d ed. 1894)
(explaining that less particularity is necessary when the facts lie within the
opponent's knowledge); CLARK, supra note 22, § 39, at 247 ("[A] general mode of
pleading was allowed . .. in the case when the facts lay more in the knowledge
of the adverse party than of the party pleading."); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN,
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 226, at 426 (James DeWitt Andrews
ed., 2d ed. 1901) (stating the same and collecting cases). Incidentally, in some
states today, the availability of prefiling discovery serves a similar ameliorative
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By contrast, the Court held Twombly's pleading to be insufficient
under the new nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading test.4
Third, the illustration of Twombly more importantly reveals the
fundamental difference in purpose between the two pleading
systems. The codes demanded factual detail as a means to focus the
case early on, not as a means to convey factual convincingness. It
required little more than an appropriate level of generality using the
available facts. There were of course concerns with meritless
complaints, but the codes' cure for such abuse rested with requiring
verification of facts by the pleader and testing by demurrer for the
legal sufficiency of the pleadings. 49 That is, fact pleading itself was
more a judicial management scheme and not substantially a
gatekeeping scheme.o Perhaps, in light of fact pleading's mixed
motives, the best way to describe its essence is that it is not
necessarily a gatekeeping regime.
Admittedly, as time went on, the fact-pleading regimes saw
more and more testing of pleadings for insufficiency of factual
statements, even if the testing was done in a rather modest pursuit
of gatekeeping that an amendment could often circumvent."
Indeed, over time, the same trend toward more screening prevailed
function. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 43, 57-60 (2010); Kourlis et al., supra note 42, at 273-
78.
48. The cases maintain that pleading on information and belief remains
permissible under nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading, but only if the rest of
the allegations satisfy the new pleading test. See Arista Records, 604 F.3d at
120-21 ("[W~e reject Doe 3's contention that Twombly and Iqbal require the
pleading of specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make the
claim plausible."). However, as part of the expected push-back by the lower
courts, see Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 838-40, one might see courts
interpreting Twombly-Iqbal loosely when the plaintiff is in a bind without
critical information-even if this interpretation directly contradicts the Court's
holdings on the Twombly and Iqbal facts. See, e.g., Trs. of the Auto. Mechs.'
Indus. Welfare & Pension Funds Local 701 v. Elmhurst Lincoln Mercury, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("Courts typically afford plaintiffs greater
latitude and require less specificity where such allegations [relating to matters
particularly within the defendants' knowledge] are concerned.").
49. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 36, at 215-19 (describing acceptable forms
of verification); id. § 82, at 521 (explaining demurrer); Subrin, supra note 22, at
330-31 (describing Field's vision of pleading, including the safeguards of
verification and demurrer).
50. See LEONARD P. MOORE, MOTION PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 75 (1955)
("Courts are generally most reluctant to deprive a litigant of his so-called 'day
in court' by disposing of any litigation with finality upon the pleadings [under
the code]."); cf. CLARK, supra note 22, § 11 (describing the proper functions of
pleading); STEPHEN, supra note 47, § 1, at 1, § 53, at 100, § 132, at 254 (same).
51. See Clark, supra note 36, at 276-77 (discussing "reversions to pleading
formalities recurring under code pleading"); Maxeiner, supra note 36, at 23-24
(characterizing the tendency to screen pleadings as increasing over the years
following the implementation of the code-pleading system).
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under common-law pleading52 and notice pleading." Unless the
procedural system were to eliminate definitively all screening of
pleadings," the urge to keep the gate seemingly will increase with
time, until a new round of pleading reform kicks in. This cycle helps
to exemplify Judge Clark's aphorism that "every age must learn its
lesson that special pleading cannot be made to do the service of trial
and that live issues between active litigants are not to be disposed of
or evaded on the paper pleadings."
The new pleading approach of Twombly-Iqbal anticipates the
typical decay by embracing gatekeeping right from the outset. And
it does so in such an open and full embrace, by knocking out
factually unsupported cases at first glance, that we can no longer
ignore how inappropriate a function such gatekeeping is at the
pleading stage as currently structured. Twombly-Iqbal calls for a
judge to weigh factual convincingness without any evidential basis
and with few procedural protections. Such a practice, in the absence
of emergency or other special circumstances, offends our
fundamental procedural principles. True, insisting on
nonconclusory statements and then testing for a reasonable
inference, to render judgment as a matter of law, is not a method
unknown at law-but officially authorizing judges routinely to do so
based on only the complaint is an invention.56 This gatekeeping
invention truly distinguishes the new regime from both fact
pleading and notice pleading.
3. How the Two Systems Stack Up
Ironically, if one were bent on tightening up notice pleading, 7
readoption of fact pleading would be considerably easier to defend
than would the Twombly-Iqbal invention. Modern academics were
52. See Clark, supra note 36, at 274-77 (discussing the disintegration of
common-law pleading); Sherwin, supra note 32, at 296-97 (describing the
encrustation of common-law pleading over time).
53. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (referring to heightened-
fact-pleading rebellions).
54. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1156-58 (making such a proposal).
55. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 46
(1957).
56. See Allan R. Stein, Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REV. 277, 284 (2009)
("To allow a judge to make those determinations based on his own sense of
history and human behavior without the benefit of an adversarial presentation
of the facts is the precise definition of prejudice: he is pre-judging, without
regard to the evidence.").
57. Much can be said against notice pleading. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note
33, at 1671-72 (noting the potential problems associated with notice pleading);
Sherwin, supra note 32, at 318-20 (same); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 985, 992-94 (1987) (contrasting the
arguments for and against reduced pleading requirements).
58. Indeed, some commentators are now championing the adoption of fact
pleading in lieu of Twombly-Iqbal. E.g., Am. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
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brought up in a federal-court culture and taught to hold in ridicule
the older procedural systems.5 But fact pleading is not a crazy
scheme at all, especially for a legal system in which discovery is
underdeveloped (and even more so in a system without our sort of
trials and our juries), and possibly even for the federal courts, which
must contend with litigation very different from the litigation of
1938.
Much can be said in defense of fact pleading."o First, the fact
pleader must think through the case: he must develop a tenable
theory, ascertain what facts are necessary to support that theory,
and perhaps conclude that the client has no valid contention.6
Second, the clarification of issues required under fact pleading puts
outer limits on permitted discovery, facilitates summary judgment
motions, and streamlines the trial.62 Third, the detail required
under fact pleading "facilitates the application of the doctrine of res
judicata.""
Most convincingly, fact pleading looks good in comparison to
nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading. It would not be nearly as
novel, uncertain, or destabilizing. First, it is an established system,
with which we have lots of experience, and it works pretty well.
Second, it is a system that its practitioners understand, which would
spare us years of wandering in the "nonconclusory plausibility"
bewilderness. Third, courts can demand the sort of factual detail
FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs.,
JOINT PROJECT, FINAL REPORT 5-6 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]
(supporting a return to code-style fact pleading for claims and affirmative
defenses); Kourlis et al., supra note 42, at 280-82 (proposing a similar change,
with a provision for prefiling discovery); Julie D. Cromer Young, Centering the
Pleading Pendulum After Iqbal (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
cf Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 147
(2009) (calling for a return to fact pleading, but only for certain "high risk"
classes of cases).
59. A nice way to appreciate this point about intergenerational disdain is to
read some of the contemporaneous paeans to code pleading, made in contrast to
common-law pleading. See, e.g., IRVING BROWNE, HUMOROUS PHASES OF THE LAW
97-124 (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1876).
60. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1150-51.
61. Id. at 1150; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 6 (describing the
additional consideration of facts required by fact pleading); Stancil, supra note
58, at 148 (explaining how strict pleading requirements decrease the number of
plaintiffs' suits).
62. FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1150; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note
58, at 6 ("Discovery cannot be framed to address the facts in controversy if the
system of pleading fails to identify them."); INST. FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL. SYs., FACT-BASED PLEADING: A SOLUTION HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 5-6
(2010) (suggesting that federal courts ought to note how fact-based pleading has
streamlined litigation in state courts).
63. FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1150; see also Clarke B. Whittier, Notice
Pleading, 31 HARv. L. REV. 501, 519 (1918) ("[Tlhe presence of essential-fact
pleadings in the record is valuable in view of the subsequent use of the case as
res judicata.").
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that fact pleading requires without imposing dangerous practices
such as gauging probability on the basis of a bare paper document,
and fact pleading would not have the undesirable effect of knocking
out meritorious cases when the plaintiff needs discovery to unearth
the required factual particulars.
Of course-even assuming the need to tighten up notice
pleading-to say that fact pleading might be preferable to Twombly-
Iqbal is not to say that resurrecting fact pleading would be a good
idea. The aforementioned experience with fact pleading that led to
the federal reform of 1938 suggests that fact pleading tends to work
out in ways that are far from optimal. Moreover, the modem
champions of gatekeeping could too easily co-opt any resurrected
version of fact pleading and turn it to their purposes.
B. Generating Subsidiary Myths
The first myth might be losing its importance as it dies a
natural death, that is, as experience with Twombly-Iqbal makes
obvious just how different the new doctrine is from fact pleading.
However, two new specific misunderstandings of nonconclusory-and-
plausible pleading have sprung from it to become mythical
corollaries.
1. Mythical Corollary 1.1: The Nonconclusoriness Step Draws
from Fact-Pleading Doctrine
a. Nonconclusoriness Is Key, but Uncertain and Novel. In
applying the new test to complaints, a court's determination of
which allegations to ignore as conclusory will do much of the critical
work. As an illustration, Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent argued
that the majority had managed to dismiss the civil rights complaint
by rejecting good allegations as conclusory, rather than by playing
with plausibility.' So, this key step needs definition.
As everyone is now realizing, the determination of
conclusoriness remains an unclear and undeniably subjective step.
Conclusory allegations include any bare assertion that an element of
the cause of action exists.6 5 But perhaps they will include more. A
candidate for conclusoriness would be "deductions of fact," as
64. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1960-61 (2009) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (identifying allegations that the majority, but not he, considered
conclusory).
65. See Hartnett, supra note 46, at 491-93 (equating a "conclusory"
allegation to one alleging merely a claim's element); cf Stephen R. Brown,
Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the
Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 26),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1469638 ("An allegation in a complaint is
conclusory when the allegation attempts to plead directly an element of a claim
that is only indirectly sensory-perceptible.").
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opposed to more purely factual assertions.66 The probable end result
is that courts will look mainly at what the plaintiff appears to be
alleging to have actually happened (before taking those allegations
as true and asking whether they generate a plausible inference of
liability).17 But still one will yearn for more definiteness, if possible.
A good starting place for pinning down the meaning of
nonconclusoriness is to acknowledge that it does not draw its
meaning from fact pleading. It is all new-even though fact
pleading had a verbally similar prohibition.'
The code courts literally condemned "legal conclusions," but
they did not actually invoke a law/fact line. 69 As always, the pleader
was to avoid pleading pure law.70 Fact pleading went further. The
pleader was to avoid legal characterization, in order to leave the test
of legal sufficiency as a task for the court.71  The conclusoriness
prohibition thus swept up some mixed questions. It even included
fact-heavy assertions, such as an assertion that the pleader was a
"holder" of a bond if that was an issue in the case. 72 Accordingly,
commentators often spoke of a general prohibition on "conclusions,"
not just legal conclusions.
Ultimately, this prohibition on conclusions was meant to keep
factual detail at an appropriate level: not too general, while not too
66. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
67. See Steinman, supra note 41, at 1334-39 (defining a "conclusory"
allegation as one that fails to identify the real-world acts or events that entitle
the plaintiff to relief, that is, an allegation that fails to allege concretely what
happened); cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009) (proposing looking to "observed or experienced
objective facts about what transpired").
68. See GEORGE L. PHILLIPS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CODE
PLEADING § 402, at 461 (Percival W. Viesselman ed., 2d ed. 1932) ("If the
conclusion is reached by natural reasoning it is one of ultimate fact; if reached
only by the application of artificial rules of law, it is a legal conclusion."); cf. id.
§ 405 (explaining that an allegation such as indebtedness might be one of fact in
one complaint (say, for goods sold) and a legal conclusion in another (say, to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance), depending on whether the law will be applied to
the allegation in the lawsuit). But of supra note 28 and accompanying text
(suggesting the location of the line might depend on how likely the allegation
will be in dispute).
69. See Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint:
Common Law-Codes-Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899,912-13,917 (1961).
70. See id. at 911-12.
71. See PHILLIPS, supra note 68, §§ 403-404.
72. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 229 & n.60.
73. E.g., id. § 38, at 225, 231. It is true that John Norton Pomeroy spoke
more in terms of a law/fact divide. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
§ 423, at 640 (5th ed. 1929). But he nonetheless gave the conclusoriness test
very broad application by approving allegations only of "dry, naked, actual
facts." Id. Moreover, his position received considerable and devastating
criticism. See, e.g., James, supra note 69, at 912-16.
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specific. In application, it was a matter of degree only. A helpful
image was that the pleader should not allege a conclusion that the
adjudicator had to find to decide the case, but instead should stay
one step back from that conclusion.7 ' Thus, the conclusoriness test
blocked only critical conclusions, the ones on major points. Here is a
concrete formulation of that image:
The comparison of an action to a syllogism is a favorite one. It
is said that the major premise is a rule of law, not to be
pleaded; the minor premise, the facts of the case making the
rule of law applicable (these alone are to be pleaded); and the
76
conclusion is the judgment of the court.
Moreover, the only effect of pleading a conclusion under the codes
was that the court could strike it as surplusage before any testing
for legal sufficiency.7
The conclusory/nonconclusory distinction did not really survive
the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because
the Rules did not expressly reject the "legal conclusion" phrase,
some early cases did use it.7" But this usage has become less
common over the years. In any event, the prevailing view was that
no separate conclusoriness test applied under Rule 8.80 The court
might require more notice occasionally, or more frequently it might
treat the case as one that fell under a federal fact-pleading
provision. 1 But notice pleading imposed no separate conclusoriness
test, by which the court would ignore certain allegations when going
through the complaint. There was simply no reason to knock out as
surplusage any summarizing conclusions. Consequently, the courts
74. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 231-36.
75. See id. § 38, at 234.
76. Id. § 38, at 237 n.88.
77. See Tag v. Linder, 94 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (treating
conclusions as surplusage); PHILLIPS, supra note 68, § 406.
78. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 38, at 244 n.108 (collecting cases).
79. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1218, at 276.
80. See, e.g., Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A
complaint that complies with the federal rules of civil procedure cannot be
dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts."); Brown v.
W.T. Grant Co., 53 F. Supp. 182, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (observing that whether
"the allegation in the complaint that the defendant has sold at prices in excess
of those authorized is a mere conclusion or an allegation of law, is an inquiry
which, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts need not pursue").
81. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A plaintiff
cannot base securities fraud claims on speculation and conclusory allegations.");
supra note 30; infra note 118. Here and elsewhere, courts sometimes use
"conclusory" in a pejorative sense, to sum up their condemnation. See supra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text (referring to the gatekeeping endeavor of
the heightened-fact-pleading rebellions). But such usage as a concluding label
for a dismissed complaint differs from the editing process involved in assessing
the complaint under nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading.
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operating under Rule 8 decided not to bother about conclusions.82
Twombly-Iqbal reverses direction to reinstate its version of
nonconclusoriness." But it is not thereby resurrecting fact
pleading's conclusoriness. The Court would not be happy with that
stunted kind of conclusoriness test, which aimed merely at
optimizing the pleading's level of generality." The new
nonconclusoriness has a very different aim, which entails knocking
out certain allegations in preparation for measuring the complaint's
plausibility. There are other differences. Under the new regime,
the nonconclusoriness test applies to all allegations, not just to
critical conclusions on major points." Moreover, the new screening
would not be satisfied by lopping the complaint's surplusage off the
top, but instead seeks to excise all sorts of allegations before asking
whether to dismiss the complaint.86
b. Nonconclusoriness Draws No Law/Fact Line. More
particularly, some brilliant theorists have lamented that
nonconclusoriness turns on a law/fact distinction, characterizing
this defect as a fact-pleading holdover, while astutely bemoaning the
uselessness and hopelessness of drawing a distinction between law
and fact." I disagree, believing that neither fact pleading nor the
new nonconclusoriness test involves any law/fact distinction.
I admit that Iqbal speaks of "legal conclusions":
82. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1218, at 267 ("It should be
clear ... that the federal rules do not prohibit the pleading of facts or legal
conclusions as long as fair notice is given to the parties."); id. § 1218, at 268 n.9
(collecting cases); ef CHESTER H. SMITH, SMITH'S REVIEW OF CODE PLEADING 33-
35 (1964) (presenting a table, in a study aid, that contrasts the treatment of
conclusions under the codes and under the federal rules). Of course, in testing
for legal sufficiency, a court can ignore a sweeping statement by the plaintiff
that the complaint states a legal claim. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 521-57 (3d ed.
2004).
83. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
84. See Dodson, supra note 36, at 461-62.
85. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly,
Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 913-15 (2010);
Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the
Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 517 n.98 (2009).
86. See Kilaru, supra note 85, at 914-15; Tymoczko, supra note 85, at 517
n.98.
87. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 PENN ST.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-6), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1540092 (arguing that Iqbal tells us to ignore as conclusory only
conclusions of law but that the law/fact distinction is hopeless); cf Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 530 n.59 (2010) ("The murky distinction between factual and
legal allegations in the 12(b)(6) context haunts this [Iqball decision.").
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Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. [The Court here quotes Twombly while observing:]
Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take
all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we "are
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.". . .
... While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.88
I also concede that Justice Kennedy probably derived the term "legal
conclusions" from the fact-pleading usage, doing so because the
phrase sounds good. And maybe he even thought the modifier was
doing some actual work.
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy did not use that phrase to draw a
real distinction. He instead used "legal conclusion" in a conclusory
way, ironically enough. Henceforth, the label "legal conclusion" will
attach to any sort of allegation, legal or factual, that a court can
ignore as a matter of law.
Justice Kennedy would of course ignore any legal conclusions,
but he was after much more. He also meant to encourage the
pleading of facts, but again he meant more. He did not mean to say
that a court should ignore only legal statements. Justice Kennedy
would reject conclusory factual allegations too. The Iqbal facts
themselves best demonstrate this point. Justice Kennedy's opinion
parsed the plaintiffs complaint and, viewing each allegation in
isolation, held that the following highly factual allegations were
mere "legal conclusions" that a court must disregard:
(1) Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller
'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [Iqbal]' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.'"
(2) Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of this policy.
(3) Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it.
That is, when Justice Kennedy passed from discussing the test to
88. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 1951.
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applying it, he was not applying a law/fact distinction. He was
applying only a conclusory/nonconclusory distinction.
More generally, a law/fact distinction had nothing to do with the
Court's logic or purpose. To knock out the kinds of allegations that
the Court wanted to discard, it had to sweep more broadly than
conclusions of law. Seldom would a "conclusory" allegation involve
only law, as a plaintiff should not even be alleging law. Usually, the
kind of "conclusory" allegation disdained by the Court would involve
an application of law to fact, but not always. Sometimes, a purely
factual allegation would run afoul of the Court's thinking. Indeed,
the new test could cut more deeply into fact than did fact pleading:
rather than hewing to fact pleading's line between "legal conclusion"
and "ultimate fact," the Court's test could sometimes reject an
allegation of "ultimate fact" and so insist on the formerly prohibited
pleading of "evidence."90 It seems as if the Court, in a throwback to
Pomeroy, wanted to require the pleading of "dry, naked, actual
facts.""
The only way the law/fact divide enters this arena is that the
Court has added a test of factual sufficiency to the pleading stage, in
addition to the test of legal sufficiency that Rule 12(b)(6) imposed
from its beginning and that continues unchanged under Twombly-
Iqbal.92 In the application of the Court's new test of factual
sufficiency, however, the law/fact divide is irrelevant.
2. Mythical Corollary 1.2: The Plausibility Step Resembles
Fact-Pleading Doctrine
a. How Plausibility Works. The next step-the plausibility
test-is even more unclear and subjective." This standard asks
90. Recall that the rejected allegation of an agreement in Twombly was
almost purely factual in nature. See Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and
Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 10 n.56), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585331.
And it would have constituted proper fact pleading. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-48.
91. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
92. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2010)
(dismissing a legal claim by a football ticket holder, brought in response to the
"Spygate" scandal, for legal insufficiency); supra text accompanying note 7. See
generally Wendy G. Couture, Conley v. Gibson's "No Set of Facts" Test: Neither
Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN STATIM 19 (2010), http://pennstatelawreview.org
/1141114 Penn Statim 19.pdf.
93. See Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More Subjectivity to
Rulings on Dismissal Motions, Judge Says, 78 U.S.L.W. 2667, 2667 (2010) ("J.
Douglas Richards... . who represented the plaintiff in Twombly, called the kind
of reasoning judges have to do under the new standard for assessing pleadings
'ugly' and agreed with [District Judge Sidney H.] Stein, that the standard is
based on a judge's personal perspective and experience of 'how the world works.'
Richards called this result the 'antithesis of justice,' 'deeply troubling,' and
'moving in the direction of yahoo justice' because it encourages bias."); Clermont
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whether inferring the moving defendant's liability on a cause of
action is "plausible" given the facts nonconclusorily pled-that is,
whether liability is a "reasonable inference."" It is unavoidably
probabilistic in nature." It thus asks whether the assertion is
reasonably possible. Although the judge is to weigh the question in
light of his or her judicial experience and common sense as applied
in the case's particular context, the shock of this subjectivity is
lessened by the realization that a reasonable factfinder (or jury) can
bring life experience and common sense to bear on the particular
96
case.
No inconsistency necessarily exists between nonconclusoriness
& Yeazell, supra note 6, at 841-46 (illustrating plausibility's lack of clarity). Or
one might ponder Emily Dickinson, I Dwell in Possiblity, in THE COMPLETE
POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 327, 327 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1960):
I dwell in Possibility-
A fairer House than Prose-
More numerous of Windows-
Superior-for Doors-
94. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Tymoczko, supra note 85, at 515. A
nice statement appears in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949):
"Plausibility" in this context does not imply that the district court
should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely
than not. Indeed, the Court expressly distanced itself from the latter
approach in Iqbal, "the plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement." As we understand it, the Court is saying
instead that the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-
matter of the case to present a story that holds together. In other
words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not
did they happen.
By contrast, the Court interpreted "strong inference" in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006), to mean that the
plaintiffs allegations must make the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent, and hence more
than merely plausible or reasonable. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007); cf Campo v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 09-3589-
CV, 2010 WL 1292329, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2010) (allowing the defendant,
but not the plaintiff, to pursue discovery in aid of its motion to dismiss);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 507, 532 (arguing
that the statute has made the motion to dismiss in securities cases a hybrid
falling somewhere between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56).
95. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("Asking for
plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement."); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ("The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).
But these statements reject only a standard as high as more-likely-than-not.
They do not disavow any and all probabilistic standards.
96. See J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REV.
623, 700 (1986).
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and plausibility testing." The plaintiff must state facts in
nonconclusory form, subject to Rule 11." The plaintiff need not offer
proof.99 Nor need the plaintiff even try to show that proof is possibly
obtainable. Instead, the court must take those facts to be true.
Next, the court must decide whether it thinks that liability is
reasonably possible, given those facts.'00 This step is admittedly an
artificial and unprecedented sort of decisional task. The precise
question for the court, it seems, is whether a factfinder, if it were to
accept the pleaded nonconclusory facts, could reasonably find the
moving defendant to be liable on the merits of the cause of action.
b. How Plausibility Compares to Summary Judgment. The
plausibility standard appears equivalent to the standard of decision
for summary judgment. Admittedly, the Court's phrasing differs
slightly, in that summary judgment speaks of "genuine issue"
without mention of plausibility. o But in essence, both motions ask
whether a factual assertion is reasonably possible, or whether a
reasonable factfinder could find for the proponent.102
This equivalence of the standards of plausibility and summary
judgment is a significant insight. It has led some commentators,
stressing the similarity between the two, to assert that a motion to
dismiss after Twombly-Iqbal has become identical to a motion for
summary judgment.' I think, however, we must recognize that
some important differences remain between the two sorts of
97. But see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867-70 (2010)
(arguing that this first step is inherently incoherent and that courts should
directly apply the plausibility test to the complaint as a whole); Stein, supra
note 56, at 281-82, 291-92 (viewing nonconclusoriness and plausibility as
redundant, and so collapsing them into a single test that demands an adequate
offer of proof).
98. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 849 (explaining the interaction
of Rule 8 and Rule 11).
99. See 61B AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 919 (1999).
100. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 79-82 (2d ed. 2009).
102. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 833 n.47 (comparing, more
carefully, the two motions' standards).
103. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17
(2010) ("The standard for the motion to dismiss has evolved in such a way as to
make the motion to dismiss the new summary judgment motion."); cf id. at 36
("[Tihe majority's requirement of plausibility ... was in effect heightened
pleading."). This prolific Seventh Amendment scholar from the University of
Illinois has built on her premise of equivalence to conclude that the motion to
dismiss is now unconstitutional. See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1855 (2008) ("The
[new] standards involve improper steps by which the courts will first assess the
plausibility of the allegations pled by the plaintiffs rather than simply accepting
them as true . . . .").
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motions. Most importantly, the latter proceeds without the
evidential development and procedural protections applicable upon
summary judgment.104
A difference cutting the other way, but another that keeps the
two motions from blending quite as much as some say they do, is the
motions' depths of operation. In arguing identity, perhaps the
commentators are imagining Twombly-Iqbal to work at the depth
that fact pleading did. Fact pleading applied its yearning for
appropriate detail to every allegation. Similarly, summary
judgment can burrow down to the fact-by-fact level, as it tests each
for reasonable possibility.
By contrast, the new plausibility test for pleading does not
apply to everything-it does not apply element-by-element or
allegation-by-allegation or fact-by-fact. Instead, Twombly-Iqbal
asks no more than whether inferring the moving defendant's
ultimate liability on the cause of action is plausible.'05 "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged."106 The court should look at the
alleged merits of the cause of action, and ask whether the existence
of all its elements is sufficiently likely.10' Of course, a dismissing
court can focus on the implausibility of one key allegation (such as
the existence of an agreement in restraint of trade" ), because the
implausibility of that one allegation necessarily implies the
implausibility of overall liability. Nevertheless, the court's assigned
task remains to gauge the convincingness of asserted liability in
order to weed out weak claims.
Therefore, at least thus far in the doctrine's development, the
new pleading regime tests the plausibility only of the overall or final
liability inference.1o' It does not test the plausibility of allegations
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. For other differences, see Clermont & Yeazell,
supra note 6, at 834 nn.48-49 (discussing the frequency with which the motions
are granted and their respective burdens of proof).
105. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
106. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); see also id. at 1950
(requiring "a plausible claim for relief"); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 570
(requiring "plausible entitlement to relief" or "a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face").
107. Curiously, by testing the plausibility of the conjoined string of the
cause's elements, Twombly-Iqbal treats the famous conjunction paradox in a
way that is at odds with the rest of the law. The Court's innovation further
disadvantages plaintiffs, at least in theory, because it is harder to show the
requisite probability for a conjunction than for an individual element. See
FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1362-65.
108. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.
109. See Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4
(8th Cir. 2010) ("[Olur task is to review the plausibility of the plaintiffs claim as
a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation." (citing Braden v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that "the
complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine
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separate from the merits of liability, as summary judgment can do.
Summary judgment can produce judgments for the defendant based
on an affirmative defense or a plea to the jurisdiction or in
abatement, or even judgments for the plaintiff. It can also produce
partial summary adjudication on particular facts."'
Another way to make this point is to say that Twombly-Iqbal,
problematic though it might be, is not as broadly applicable as
summary judgment is. Indeed, this kind of overreading of Twombly-
Iqbal is illustrative of the next myth.
II. MYTH #2: TWOMBLY-IQBAL APPLIES TO ALL PARTS
OF ALL PLEADINGS
Many cases and commentators view Twombly-Iqbal as
discouragingly broad in application. For example, some courts have
talked of Twombly-Iqbal as applying to all pleadings, including
those of defendants. Indeed, in the current confusion, many lower
courts are applying the new test to affirmative defenses,"' although
their reasoning is largely on the level of "sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.""12
Yet, without a further pronouncement from the Court itself,
Twombly-Iqbal should apply only to claims, albeit by whomever
asserted."' First, in those cases the Court was avowedly
interpreting a Rule, rather than inventing a principle applicable to
all pleadings. It was construing the word "showing" in Rule 8(a)(2)
governing claims, a word that does not appear in Rule 8(b) or (c)
treating answers. One could, however, counterargue that the
provisions on answers have always implicitly incorporated the
general pleading requirements,1' despite the limited time for
whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible"))).
110. See FIELD ETAL., supra note 10, at 1325-26.
111. See, e.g., Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 648 (D. Kan.
2009) (striking affirmative defenses, with leave to amend), noted in 25 FED.
LITIGATOR 89, 90 (2010) (observing that probably a majority of cases now apply
Twombly-Iqbal to affirmative defenses); Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009
WL 1076279, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009) (finding an affirmative defense to
be insufficiently pled under Twombly).
112. Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL
2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (dictum) ("Assuming, without deciding,
that sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, the court is inclined to think
that a defendant has the same Rule 8 obligations ... as does a plaintiff.").
113. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620,
623 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Counterclaims, like claims, are subject to Rule 8(a)'s
pleading requirements.").
114. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 576 F. Supp. 985, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Affirmative defenses
are of course also subject to the general pleading requirements of Rules 8(a),
8(e) and 9(b), generally requiring only a short and plain statement of the facts
but demanding particularity as to the circumstances constituting fraud and
mistake."). But see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1274, at 618 n.7 (citing
Instituto as the sole case to take this proposition so far as to apply FED. R. CIV.
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preparing an answer."' Second, and more importantly then, the
Court was establishing a gatekeeping test for people trying to bring
a claim into court, an aim that should not bear on the opposing
party. The opposing party is not opening a new proceeding, and also
defenses probably impose less risk of abuse because less intrusive
and burdensome discovery comes with them than with claims." 6
Therefore, on both the doctrinal and the purposive level,
Twombly-Iqbal applies only to claimants."' The backup test of
notice pleading instead applies to defendants' pleadings, as it does
everywhere else.' 8
For another example of overbreadth, some cases apply
Twombly-Iqbal to the plaintiffs threshold allegations. Thus, lower
courts are confusingly applying the new test to issues beyond the
merits, even to personal jurisdiction" or class allegations. 120
P. 9(b) to affirmative defenses). Of course, that the general principles of notice
pleading have been applied to answers in the past does not necessarily imply
that nonconclusory-and-plausible principles should apply.
115. See Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC, No. 09-CV-02870-
LTB-BNB, 2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010) ("[Ilt is reasonable to
impose stricter pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significantly more
time to develop factual support for his claims than a defendant who is only
given 20 days to respond to a complaint and assert its affirmative defenses.").
116. Cf. Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift in Civil
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2009, at A10 (positing that the pre-Iqbal
"approach. . . gave plaintiffs settlement leverage. Just by filing a lawsuit, a
plaintiff could subject a defendant to great cost and inconvenience in the pre-
trial fact-finding process called discovery.").
117. See Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 WL
4981730, at *4 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009) (recognizing that "[d]istrict courts are
divided on whether Twombly and Iqbal should extend to affirmative defenses,"
and comparing three cases in which courts did not extend Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses with two cases in which courts did).
118. Of course, one could argue about what notice requires. Compare Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294-95 (7th Cir. 1989)
(striking a barely stated defense), with Wyshak v. City Nat'1 Bank, 607 F.2d
824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (declining to strike a defense because the plaintiff
received fair notice of the nature of the defense).
119. See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063,
1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly to determination of personal
jurisdiction, but using it to uphold jurisdiction). See generally Jayne S. Ressler,
Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 627, 633-34, 649
(2009) (arguing for application of the plausibility test to disputes over personal
jurisdiction).
120. See, e.g., Hodczak v. Latrobe Specialty Steel Co., No. CIV 08-649, 2009
WL 911311, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding class allegations too
speculative under Twombly); cf Nicholas v. CMRE Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-
4857JLL, 2009 WL 1652275, at *4 (D.N.J. June 11, 2009) (applying the
conclusoriness branch of Twombly-Iqbal to require a more definite statement of
the class allegations). See generally Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality
Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2045, 2051 (2010) (applying the plausibility test to
each allegation subject to FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but then struggling with how to
apply it to class allegations).
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This extension reflects the tendency to view the cases as
unleashing a free-floating plausibility test for use against any
factual assertions, creating the rough equivalent of a preliminary
summary adjudication procedure. Yet, Twombly-Iqbal actually says
that all nonconclusory allegations are to be taken as true and that
the plausibility test is to be applied only to the ultimate inference of
liability of the moving defendant on the particular cause of action.12'
The plausibility test should apply only to test the merits of liability,
and so should not apply to any other allegations outside Rule 8(a)(2).
There is no reason thus far, on the basis of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements, to think that Twombly and Iqbal apply to
jurisdiction or other threshold matters.12
Accordingly, a court assumes to be true any allegations of
jurisdiction or class members' positions, at least as long as they are
nonconclusory-until the jurisdiction or certification decision, when
the plaintiff must provide proof.'2 ' As a pleading matter, if pleading
the matter is required at all, the test for such threshold allegations
is fair notice. 2 1
On the one hand, in recounting these examples, I do not want to
fault pessimism. It is probably the sound betting strategy here, as
the Court probably has worse in store. I know that by cutting
Twombly-Iqbal down to size for the time being and by pointing out
the restrictions on what the Court actually decided, I may come off
sounding like an apologist. I am not.12 1
121. See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
122. Standing, and the related doctrines of ripeness and mootness, might be
a problem-point midway between "jurisdiction" and "liability," exposing more of
the illogic of Twombly-Iqbal. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.12, at
163 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the relationship among those justiciability
doctrines). It is sounder, however, to treat such matters as jurisdictional. See
id. § 3531.15, at 319. Nevertheless, the pleading standard for such matters still
might need to become more demanding than notice pleading. See David M.
Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390,
391, 394 (1980). But that is a decision for another day in court.
123. See Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8786,
2009 WL 856682, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (undertaking different
analyses for Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6)); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643
F. Supp. 2d 382, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (extending a different analysis to FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).
124. Some find an illogic in being more demanding on pleading the merits
than on pleading jurisdiction. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in
United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 565-75 (2010)
(arguing for extending Twombly-Iqbal to allegations of jurisdiction). The simple
explanation is that the purpose of demanding plausibility testing does not
extend beyond the allegations of ultimate liability. Cf Kevin M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978-79 (2006) (observing a lesser
standard of proof for jurisdiction than on the merits).
125. In my defense, I can only reassert that I am a negativist on Twombly-
Iqbal for its craftsmanship and other legal process. Nevertheless, I am not
resting my argument in this Article on my opinion of the cases' legal
1361
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On the other hand, I am saying that pessimism's role should
remain cabined. It should serve only as an opinion about the future,
not as a basis for contending that Twombly-Iqbal has already
decided all these extensions in favor of screening. Critics can
sometimes make a bad decision seem worse than it is and sometimes
help fulfill their own prophecies of terrible results.12 6
Thus, my bottom line is that pessimism can go overboard." 7 I
think that Twombly-Iqbal thereby enjoys the fear mongering of its
enemies. But still, in adjusting one's pessimistic outlook, one needs
to beware falling into the next myth that draws on optimism.
My point, however, is a bit more subtle than to suggest that
there is one true path, from which one can fall off to either side, so
that being too pessimistic or too optimistic can lead to an
overreading or an underreading. Instead, I am saying that this
second myth lies in supposing that no limits exist on the scope of
Twombly-Iqbal's application to the whole pleading phase. The
upcoming third myth is different in kind, as it supposes that the
Twombly-Iqbal Court's diffidence in purpose left its rule to govern
only certain kinds of cases or promised that other exceptions will
save us. Proof of a difference in kind between the two myths resides
process. Nor am I am resting on my view on the need for pleading reform. Cf
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 823 (criticizing the legal process without
taking a position on whether pleading should be tightened up). In fact, I
remain open-minded on the need for pleading reform. And I certainly realize
that the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars have sharply different views of the
matter. See ABA SEC. LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED
REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/1209-
report.html ("[Seventy percent] of defense lawyers, but only 21% of plaintiffs'
lawyers, believe that notice pleading has become a problem."). Instead, in this
Article I am writing only about how to read Twombly and Iqbal.
126. See, e.g., Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL
2604447, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (dismissing a complaint, with leave to
amend, in a removed slip-and-fall case for an accident in a Virginia Dollar
General store).
In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show
how the liquid came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or
should have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiffs
accident occurred.. . . While consistent with the possibility of the
Defendant's liability, the Plaintiffs conclusory allegations that the
Defendant was negligent because there was liquid on the flood [sic],
but that the Defendant failed to remove the liquid or warn her of its
presence are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Id. This decision accomplished nothing. The plaintiff thereafter amended to
tell a much more specific story, and the case proceeded to discovery.
127. For example, one witness in the House hearings on Iqbal said that
"Iqbal returns us to the kind of legal practice Dickens condemned in Bleak
House." Access to Justice Denied-Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 72 (2009) (statement of John Vail, Center for
Constitutional Litigation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings
/printers/111th111-36_53090.PDF.
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in the realization that a determined misreading of the cases could
simultaneously fall prey to both.
III. MYTH #3: THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL JUSTICES DIDN'T REALLY
MEAN IT
Other judges and theorists, although they may also be unhappy
with Twombly-Iqbal, show a more optimistic bent. Finding the
Court's position to be encouragingly ambiguous in meaning, they
have come up with clever ways to limit and circumvent the
- 128
opinions.
I am not saying these optimists are wrong in their analyses.
Indeed, they are among the most insightful analysts working on this
problem. Instead, I am merely disagreeing with their optimistic
predictions about the future. (Note that I am not even pausing on
the biggest myths of all, propagated by those who assert that there
is nothing new in these cases 2 9 or that the Twombly-Iqbal test lay
128. See cases cited supra note 48 (mentioning lower courts' resistance to
Twombly-Iqbal); Brown, supra note 65, at 37-41 (reading the plausibility test to
measure loosely whether the plaintiff has accurately predicted that the
allegations will have evidentiary support); Hartnett, supra note 46, at 507
(suggesting that discovery can proceed, even after Iqbal, while the motion to
dismiss is pending); Noll, supra note 41, at 36-37 (arguing that courts, after
resolving Iqbal's massive uncertainties, might lead us to a less terrible place
than Iqbal's critics fear); Stein, supra note 56, at 302-06 (taking the view that
Iqbal was a very special case, which will not change pleading in ordinary cases);
Steinman, supra note 41, at 1320-33 (reconciling Twombly-Iqbal with pre-
Twombly authority, and thereby developing a new paradigm of "plain
pleading").
129. See, e.g., Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)
("Notice pleading, however, remains the rule in federal courts, requiring only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim.'"); Daniel R. Karon, "Twas Three Years
After Twombly and All Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from
Near or from Far"-The Unremarkable Effort of the U.S. Supreme Court's Re-
expressed Pleading Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L.
REV. 571 (2010); see also Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to
Courts: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009)
(statement of Gregory G. Garre, former Solicitor General), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189.
While unquestionably important, the Supreme Court's decisions
in Twombly and Iqbal were hardly bolts from the blue. To the
contrary, they are firmly grounded in decades of prior precedent at
both the Supreme Court and federal appellate court level concerning
the pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Indeed, what would have been truly remarkable in light of
this well-settled precedent is if the Supreme Court had decided that
either the complaint in Twombly or Iqbal were sufficient to proceed
past Rule 12(b)(6).
Id.; accord Access to Justice Denied-Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of Gregory G. Katsas,
Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_091027_1.html ("I believe that these
1363
HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1363 2010
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
undiscovered within Rule 8(a)(2) for seventy years.' Instead, I am
writing of those who are perplexed by this development.)
To begin the refutation of optimism, I note that it has a bad
track record in this arena. Many had optimistically predicted a
narrow reach of Twombly."' But that holding turned out not to be
limited to certain kinds of cases. In Iqbal, the Court ruled, by
express wording, that Twombly applied to all federal complaints.'
decisions faithfully interpret and apply the pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are consistent with the vast bulk of prior
precedent, and strike an appropriate balance between the legitimate interests
of plaintiffs and defendants."). Messrs. Garre and Katsas represented the
defendants in Iqbal as the Solicitor General and a Justice Department attorney,
respectively.
130. See, e.g., Vorassi v. US Steel, No. 09cv0769, 2009 WL 2870635, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (stating that the new "standard does not impose a
heightened burden on the claimant above that already required by Rule 8");
Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust
Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 645 (2008) ("Twombly does
not state a new way to understand pleading procedure."). Contra Mark
Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False
Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
30-50), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548232 (applying Twombly as if
it were a new procedural standard).
131. See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive
Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured
Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 631-36, 639 (2007)
(approving, with reservations, Twombly's application of pleading's substantive-
sufficiency test to this antitrust case); J. Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of
Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of Historical Monopoly,
82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 849, 851 (2008) (taking a very narrow view of Twombly);
Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 122 (2007),
http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2007/31/lrcoll2007n3lBra
dley.pdf ("'Plausibility' is an element of a certain kind of antitrust conspiracy
claim, not a standard for pleadings in general."). For another route to a
restricted view, see Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 1063, 1083-85 (2009) (criticizing those who believe Twombly applies only
to complex cases involving significant discovery); cf Douglas G. Smith, The
Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 26-27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1463844 (approving Iqbal as an evolution in the pleading standard that is
likely to increase the efficiency and fairness of civil practice).
132. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); cf Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 6, at 856 (sketching the possibility of having the pleading
rules vary with the circumstances). But cf Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy,
Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of
Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1589732 (arguing that the Court was establishing a pleading test that was not
transsubstantive, and explaining Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), in
those terms); Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 76-77), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract-1587842
(suggesting that Twombly-Iqbal's beneficial ambiguity permits variable
application); Stein, supra note 56, at 303-04 (suggesting that Twombly-Iqbal's
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We now have to adjust to the broad meaning of the Court's
holdings,"' even if some holdouts refuse to do so."
How big is the actual impact of the change, out in the world?
On the one hand, in the years before Twombly-Iqbal, many pleaders
were including tremendous detail, and many observers attributed
this practice to the encouragement, if not requirement, of the lower
courts. "5 To some extent, notice pleading was already gone. On the
other hand, many courts, naturally enough, will still deny motions
to dismiss after Twombly-Iqbal.136 After all, it is true that some
dismissals are beneficial. So, it is not wise to proclaim that the sky
is falling.
The desire for more precision runs into the facts that no
effective empirical work exists yet on the costs or benefits of the new
regime, and any empirical study will prove dauntingly difficult to
perform. 13 Still, we can safely say that the Court's holdings will
necessarily produce considerable effects.'38 Those holdings will lead
to motions being made in new situations, and to more expensive
motions that will involve both fighting over Twombly-Iqbal's
meaning and dealing with fact-intensive disputes. Defendants have
reportedly received the new regime with exuberance, using the
expressly context-dependent application is the route to variable application).
133. Compare Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation
of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 935-36 (2009) (arguing that what the
author saw as the Court's "thin plausibility" standard could be justifiable, if
adopted by the proper statutory or rule process), with Bone, supra note 97, at
870-83 (criticizing the now-accepted "thick" screening).
134. See, e.g., Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner,
J.) (dictum) (suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal were special cases involving,
respectively, complex litigation and qualified immunity); Transcript of
Proceedings at 2, Madison v. City of Chi., No. 1:09-CV-03629 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14,
2010) (Shadur, J.) (stating "you don't have to be a nuclear physicist to recognize
that Twombly and Iqbal don't operate as a kind of universal 'get out of jail free'
card," and declining to apply Twombly-Iqbal in an employment discrimination
case). Such approaches receive criticism even in the optimistic Noll, supra note
41 (manuscript at 19-20).
135. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45
Auz. L. REV. 987 (2003) (finding barebones notice pleading to be far less
common than assumed).
136. See Lori Andrus, In the Wake of Iqbal, TRIAL, Mar. 2010, at 20, 24-28
(collecting cases that denied motions).
137. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 839 n.66, 848 n.98 (criticizing
early empirical work as biased to exaggerate the Twombly-Iqbal effect, and
cataloging impediments to empirical work).
138. "The fact that the Supreme Court dismissed two complaints, including
a complaint seven federal judges found sufficient, indicates a new willingness to
decide cases on the pleadings. . . ." Noll, supra note 41 (manuscript at 39). But
cf CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
CoMMITIEE 2 (May 17, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CVO5-2010.pdf ("But it is clear that the
evolutionary processes of judicial refinement are moving rapidly. They also
seem to be working well."); supra note 48 (mentioning lower courts' resistance
to Twombly-Iqbal).
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motions for such tactical purposes as achieving preliminary one-
sided discovery.' Even if most of these new motions fail, claimants
will now bear the accompanying burdens. 40 Those claimants who
actually need discovery to show nonconclusory plausibility will
suffer more.14' Twombly-Iqbal is having an impact here, changing
139. John A. Freedman, a partner at Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.,
says: "I am more likely now to file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in
almost every case but that does not necessarily mean the motions will be
granted." Janet Cecelia Walthall, Iqbal, Twombly Pleading Standards Hotly
Debated by Conference Panelists, 78 U.S.L.W. 2782, 2782 (2010).
140. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO Dismiss: INFORMATION ON
COLLECTION OF DATA (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies
/rules/Motions to Dismiss042710.pdf (suggesting that the Court's two pleading
cases correlate with an increase in the number of motions to dismiss under FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)). The Federal Judicial Center plans to refine this study,
focusing on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Any such study looking at the universe of all such motions, however, is apt
to understate the effect of Twombly-Iqbal. Obviously, the case-selection effect
of litigants' adjusting to the change in pleading law comes into play, because the
study is ignoring the cases not filed. In a perfect world, cases like Twombly-
Iqbal would have no effect on the number of motions or number of dismissals,
as both plaintiffs and defendants immediately adjust to the new regime.
Plaintiffs not only will gather more facts and plead more facts, but also will
sometimes choose not to pursue cases that will fall to Twombly-Iqbal. This
means that one should not expect to see major changes in the data-if only the
world were perfect.
More subtly, if one were to compile all dismissal decisions, the effects of
Twombly-Iqbal would be hard to measure because these precedents apply to
only a restricted subset of motions to dismiss (and result in final dismissal for a
smaller subset). That is, Twombly-Iqbal will have its bite only in cases in which
the plaintiff cannot plead more detail and the plaintiff nevertheless sues
without the detail. The other cases will overwhelm and mask the subsets. In
other words, the numbers of motions and dismissals might be high enough to
conceal any effect of the new regime.
As to the number of motions, I think that Twombly-Iqbal will produce
more motions. But there will be lots of 12(b)(6) motions on grounds other than
true Twombly-Iqbal grounds, such as legal insufficiency. The only safe
conclusion, then, is that the denominator of the dismissal success rate should be
suspect.
Meanwhile, as to the number of dismissals, there will be dismissals on
those non-Twombly-Iqbal grounds. There will also be some dismissals on
Twombly-Iqbal grounds when the plaintiff pleaded too little but can plead more
(and probably does so by successful amendment, perhaps while the motion to
dismiss is pending or perhaps after the motion is decided). All these usual
decisions are going to resemble but dwarf the true bite of Twombly-Iqbal, which
involves only those cases that would have succeeded under notice pleading but
now definitively fail under the new test.
In sum, when I contemplate the possibility of a relatively noninflated
numerator and an inflated denominator in the dismissal success rate, combined
with the inevitable case-selection effect, I am left wondering whether any study
looking at the numbers of motions and dismissals really could result in
anything other than a showing of little impact. Perhaps there is no substitute
for looking at a sample of cases filed and unfiled, viewing them from the inside
and on a case-by-case basis.
141. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV.
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what may have been favorable results to dismissals.1 4 2  Prime
examples include cases in which the plaintiff is suing for conspiracy
in violation of the antitrust law'4 3 or for a supervisor's violation of
the civil rights statutes.'" A subset of these new dismissals, and of
decisions not to sue, will entail meritorious suits being defeated
because of informational asymmetry.'4 5 Regret over this last effect
conflicts with the wish to dismiss meretricious suits fairly and
efficiently, thus making so difficult the policy choices in reforming
the pleading system.14 6
In any event, even if there were no big increase in the numbers
of motions or dismissals, the impact of Twombly-Iqbal is big on who
we are-in the sense of what sort of access to justice we afford, and
to what extent. we intend to continue our reliance on private
enforcement of the law. 1 4 7
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 26-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1525642.
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Cohmad Sec. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 5680 (LLS), 2010 WL
363844, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010) (dismissing with leave to replead the
SEC's securities-fraud civil action against defendants allegedly involved in the
Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme); Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 639 F.
Supp. 2d 217, 226 n.4 (D.P.R. 2009) (dismissing a civil rights complaint that
"clearly met the pre-Iqbal pleading standard under Rule 8"); Air Atlanta Aero
Eng'g Ltd. v. SP Aircraft Owner I, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 185, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("While such allegations may have provided sufficient notice pleading in
the past, Twombly and Iqbal provide clear instructions that conclusory
statements about a party's alleged intentions should be accompanied with
supporting factual allegations where circumstances so demand."); Ansley v. Fla.
Dep't of Revenue, No. 4:09cv161-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 1973548, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
July 8, 2009) ("These allegations might have survived a motion to dismiss prior
to Twombly and Iqbal. But now they do not.").
143. See, e.g., In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 898
(6th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of a suit against airlines for capping
commissions in an allegedly concerted effort to drive travel agencies out of
business).
144. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of Kenner, 351 F. App'x 890, 899-900 (5th Cir.
2009) (affirming dismissal against chief investigator).
145. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND.
L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666770
(suggesting empirically that the cases dismissed under Twombly-Iqbal would be
no less successful than other cases and doing so by tracking the ultimate
outcome in 1990s cases in which an appellate court had reversed dismissal on
grounds no longer viable under Twombly-Iqbal). This clever study is far from
definitive, of course. One problem is calculating a "success rate," which should
be something like the percentage of claims found to be well-founded, as
evidenced either by a judgment on the merits or by a settlement sufficiently
close to initial demands to serve as a reliable proxy for such a judgment.
Another problem is defining a comparable cohort of cases for calculation of a
background success rate.
146. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975)
(distinguishing "the meritorious Rule 10b-5 suit from the meretricious one").
147. See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009)
("Thus, while a plaintiff must offer sufficient factual allegations to show that he
or she is not merely engaged in a fishing expedition or strike suit, we must also
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Optimists might want to believe that the Court did not intend
such significant effects. But of late the Justices seem to have
entertained steadily an image of meritless claims and discovery
being out of control, regardless of that image's accuracy. 148 The
Twombly-Iqbal Court has surely demonstrated confusion and poor
craftsmanship, but not a wavering or haphazard set of concerns.149
Much may be wrong with the new line of cases imposing the novel
and uncertain test by a faulty legal process, but the cases have
revealed a fairly coherent purpose.
In particular, Erickson v. Pardusso generated some of the early
optimism by overturning a pleading dismissal only two weeks after
Twombly."' Some observers, indeed, maintain a bit of Erickson
take account of their limited access to crucial information. If plaintiffs cannot
state a claim without pleading facts which tend systemically to be in the sole
possession of defendants, the remedial scheme of the statute will fail, and the
crucial rights secured by ERISA will suffer. These considerations counsel
careful and holistic evaluation of an ERISA complaint's factual allegations
before concluding that they do not support a plausible inference that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief.").
148. See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FJCCivilReportSept_2009.pdf/$file
/FJCCivilReport Sept 2009.pdf (painting a picture of a system not out of
control).
149. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 53-84 (2010); Richard
A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pre-Trial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60
DEPAuL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 13-14), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568127; A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide
Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 196-200 (2010);
cf Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 23),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577210 (explaining how the Court's use
of stylized language masked the enormity of the change).
150. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
151. See, e.g., Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-15 (2d Cir. 2008); Iqbal
v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Erickson was one of the
"conflicting signals [that] create some uncertainty as to the intended scope of
the Court's decision" in Twombly), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009); Ides, supra note 131, at 638-39 ("One gets the sense, given
Erickson's relative lack of 'certworthiness,' that the rapidly prepared and issued
Erickson opinion was written as a reassurance that the Bell Atlantic decision
had not altered Rule 8(a)(2) pleading principles."); Jeremy D. Kerman, Note,
Righting the Notice Pleading Ship: How Erickson v. Pardus Solidifies the
Modern Supreme Court Trend of Notice-Giving in Light of Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 691, 693 (2009) (opining that
"Erickson demonstrates the Court's desire to isolate Twombly as an outlier");
Amy Howe, More on Yesterday's Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Pardus,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2007, 5:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/more
-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-06-7317-erickson-v-pardus/ (concluding that the
Court "decided to summarily reverse in Erickson, likely in order to counteract
any impression that could arise that Twombly was intended to set a
[Vol. 451368
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hope even after Iqbal.152
William Erickson, as a pro se plaintiff, brought a civil rights
claim against prison officials, alleging that they had endangered his
life by wrongfully terminating his medical treatment for hepatitis
C.'53 After the district court dismissed the complaint on its legal
merits, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff
had pleaded the substantial-harm element in a "conclusory" way.1
This being in 2006, before Twombly, the appellate court was using
"conclusory" in heightened fact pleading's pejorative sense, which
worked to the special detriment of prisoner litigation. 15 The
Supreme Court summarily vacated the ruling for having departed
"in so stark a manner from the pleading standard mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 5  Its action came via a per
curiam opinion,"7 which seemed neither fully cognizant of the new
Twombly test nor intent on expanding it. The Court cited Twombly
for the propositions that notice pleading does not require allegations
of "specific facts" and that the "judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint."'
Erickson, this tonic for optimists, deserves a reread after Iqbal.
Although it sounded so permissive, it is reconcilable. And to
reconcile it, one need not resort to the pro se status of the plaintiff.
The key is to recognize that the Erickson Court left the Twombly-
Iqbal test unaddressed. The Court merely found the detailed
allegations not to be conclusory in the old sense, acting just in the
way that the Swierkiewicz-Leatherman Court did and further
confirming that those cases are still good law." 9 The Court did not
particularly high pleading standard").
152. See, e.g., Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Any
[suspicion] that Twombly had repudiated the general notice-pleading regime of
Rule 8 was put to rest two weeks later, when the Court issued Erickson. . . .");
Stein, supra note 56, at 306 (interpreting Erickson as support for a limited and
variable pleading standard).
153. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 89-90.
154. Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App'x 694, 696-97 (10th Cir. 2006), aff'g No.
05 CV 00405 LTB MJW, 2006 WL 650131 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2006) (never using
the word "conclusory"), vacated, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); see id. at 698 ("[Pllaintiff
has made only conclusory allegations to the effect that he has suffered a
cognizable independent harm as a result of his removal from the
Interferon/Ribavirin treatment program.").
155. See supra note 81.
156. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90.
157. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on other grounds. Id. at 95.
158. Id. at 93-94; see also id. at 94 ("The complaint stated that Dr. Bloor's
decision to remove petitioner from his prescribed hepatitis C medication was
'endangering [his] life.' It alleged this medication was withheld 'shortly after'
petitioner had commenced a treatment program that would take one year, that
he was 'still in need of treatment for this disease,' and that the prison officials
were in the meantime refusing to provide treatment." (citations omitted)).
159. See id. at 94; Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 502 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993); supra text accompanying notes
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need to reach, and so made no reference to, any plausibility test.6 o
Thus, Erickson does not mean that weak but appealing cases will
henceforth survive. It provides no basis for hope that the Court will
cut back on Twombly-Iqbal. There is simply no inconsistency, or
even overlap, between Erickson and Twombly-Iqbal.16 '
More generally, one might wonder why the Justices in 2002
were willing to leave pleading reform to the rulemakers, 162 but by
today they have shifted into revolutionary mode. It is possible that
mounting concerns and frustrated waiting finally forced them to
take reform into their own hands. More likely, however, is that they
are inadvertent revolutionaries.' The Court stumbled into the
thicket without realizing where Twombly's path would lead.' Then
in Iqbal, a case that politically speaking had to come out the way it
did, the Court momentously decided to stay the course. By its broad
wording in this new case, it proceeded to paint itself into a corner.
Today, I find it hard to imagine that the Court's current personnel
will choose on their own to walk through the wet paint, just to undo
a revolution.
In sum, I contend that optimism in resolving the ambiguities
and unsettled questions left by Twombly-Iqbal "fails to 'hear the
music' in the Court's recent pleading decisions."'"' Hence, I would
defend-at least for being realists-those who want to turn to
Congress for a cure, 16 or to a rule amendment. 67
38-44 (referring to heightened-fact-pleading rebellions).
160. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 ("Whether petitioner's complaint is
sufficient in all respects is a matter yet to be determined."). Later the lower
court upheld part of the complaint, without citing Twombly. See Erickson, 238
F. App'x at 696-700.
161. See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 140 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (arguing that
"Erickson was a 'no-brainer' of a reversal under any Rule 8 pleading standard").
162. See supra text accompanying note 38 (discussing Swierkiewicz and
Leatherman).
163. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 850-52 (cataloging signs of
inadvertence).
164. The ambiguous origin of the Twombly path lay in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-48 (2005) (dismissing a
securities complaint as insufficient).
165. Noll, supra note 41 (manuscript at 39).
166. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 857 n.133 (listing proposed
statutes). But see Michael Robert Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to
Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MIcH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1627704.
167. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 857-59 (listing proposed
amendments); Miller, supra note 149, at 103-27 (collecting newer proposals);
Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal- Where Do We Go from
Here?, 95 IowA L. REV. BULL. 24, 33 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edul-ilr/bulletin
/ILRB_95_Hartnett.pdf (proposing, as a new Rule, that if a "court decides that
the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for discovery, it must allow for that discovery"); Summary
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CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to convey the meaning of the recent eye-
opening cases on federal pleading law. To do so, the Article refuted
the three leading myths about the Twombly and Iqbal cases and
thereby established these three propositions: First, the Supreme
Court has not revived code-style fact pleading. This first conclusion
implies that the codes' law/fact distinction plays no role in screening
allegations under the new test for nonconclusoriness, and it also
implies that the courts should not apply the new test for plausibility
to each allegation but only to the ultimate assertion of liability.
Second, we academics must beware of overstating the scope of the
new cases. Their holdings apply only to claimants' pleadings, and
indeed only to the claimants' allegations on the merits. Third, we
must also beware of reading optimistically the opinions' evident
confusions to infer an aimless Court. The Court's rather steady
purpose indicates that the Justices now mean business as pleading
revolutionaries.
The Twombly-Iqbal regime is a novel and uncertain one, as well
as one instituted by an unwise legal process. But at the core, it is
clear what the Court is trying to do-which is a good deal more
revolutionary than reinstituting fact pleading. The change in
pleading, unless somehow undone, represents a truly major
development in modern procedure.
Comparison of Bar Association Submissions to the Duke Conference Regarding
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2010 CONF. ON CivIL LITIG. 3-7 (Apr. 26,
2010), http://civilconference.uscourts.gov (collecting proposals). For the current
status of the amendment process, see CIVIL RuLEs ADVISORY COMM., supra note
138, at 2-4.
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